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SALE OF LAND FOR TAXES IN KENTUCKY
By EARL S. WILSON*
The laws of Kentucky as they apply to the sale of land for
taxes have been for years the source of a number of interesting
legal questions. In Kentucky, land on which taxes are delinquent
is sold by the sheriff in satisfaction of state, county, school and
special district tax claims.
The sale necessarily must have some effect upon the titular
interests or rights of any person in the property which is the
subject matter of the sale. It will also create certain new
interests or rights in the property. However, it is not always
easy to determine exactly what significance or effect the sale may
have in this respect. For example, a sale conducted exactly in
compliance with the law will not have the same effect on title or
create the same rights as a sale not so made; also, the effect of
changes or amendments in the law following the sale or events
occurring subsequent thereto will vary in accordance with
whether the sale was executed as required by law at the time it
was made.
Sections 1682 and 4149, Kentucky Statutes, considered
together set out the conditions which must exist before land can
be sold for taxes and the manner in which the sale must be made.
Literal compliance with the requirements of these sections
is necessary to constitute a valid sale. If there is an absence of
any statutory condition necessary to entitle the sheriff to make
the sale or if he fails to take any statutory step required of him
in making the sale, it is invalid.' But if the sale is executed
*Delinquent Tax Attorney, Kentucky Department of Revenue;
B.S. 1930, LL.B. 1936, University Kentucky.
' Miller v. Powers, 184 Ky. 417, 212 S.W. 453 (1919).
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strictly in compliance with the law, it is valid.2 An invalid sale
does not convey any titular interest to the purchaser.3 However,
the purchaser at an invalid sale, whether it be the state or another, has a lien on the property for the amount of taxes, penal4
ties, interest and costs paid by him plus legal interest thereon.
The purchaser may be the state, county and other taxing district.
Such taxing districts become the purchaser only when no one else
will bid the amount of taxes, penalty, interest, costs, and commissions for which the land is being sold. 5 The theory blas been frequently advanced that when the sale is valid, the purchaser, during the time allowed for redemption, hs only a lien against the
property for the amount paid by him at the time of sale plus
taxes subsequently paid and interest thereon. Certain early
cases seemed to support that view.0 However, in Southern Securities Corp. v. Commonwealth,2 the court clearly held that if the
sale is regularly executed the original owner has left only the
right to redeem the title. It would, therefore, seem that a
titular interest was conveyed to the Commonwealth by virtue of
the sale subject to defeasance. It is now specifically provided by
statute that such sale conveys a defeasible title to the Commonwealth upon the filing of the sheriff's report or certificate of sale.7
This defeasible title may ripen into a fee simple title upon
fulfillment
of certain statutory requirements by the purthe
8
chaser and the expiration of the time allowed for redemption.
It can only ripen into such title as was held by the original
owner in whose name the land was assessed and sold. 9 If he had
a fee simple title, then the purchaser's title will, of course,
become a fee simple title.
Following the sale the sheriff must file with the county
court clerk a certificate setting forth the time, place, and manner
in which the sale was executed, the person to whom the land was
sold, and the amount of the sale price. 10 This certificate is a
2Metcalfe v. Commonwealth, 113 Ky. 751, 68 S.W. 1100 (1902);

Southern Securities Corp. v. Commonwealth, 245 Ky. 602, 53 S.W. (2d)
974 (1932).
a Shawler v. Carter, 221 Ky. 248, 298 S.W. 714 (1927).
'Ashland v. Stevens, 259 Ky. 797, 83 S.W. (2d) 516 (1935).
5Ky. Stat. (Carroll's 1936), Sec. 4151-2.
6James v. Blanton, 134 Ky. 803, 121 S.W. 951 (1909).
7Ky. Stat. (1938 Supplement), Sec. 4162.

•See n. 2, supra

• Hall v. Hall, 174 Ky. 356, 192 S.W. 76 (1917).
I 0Ky. Stat. (1938 Supplement), See. 4162.
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conveyance which serves as a deed if the purchaser is the ComIf the purmonwealth, county, and other taxing districts."
chaser is one other than the Commonwealth and county, he is,
upon taking possession of the property and on the expiration of
the time allowed for redemption, entitled to a deed to the
property to be issued by the sheriff.12 The sheriff's deed is prima
facie valid. 13 if the various taxing districts are the purchaser
the Commissioner of Revenue, under authority of Section 4154
of the Kentucky Statutes, 1938 Supplement, may sell the land at
public auction after possession is recovered. The Commissioner
of Revenue may make a deed to property sold by him or his agent
under authority of this section.
The statutes have since 1906 specified a time within which
the purchaser could obtain possession of the property and a time
within which the original owner could redeem it from the
purchaser. 14
Briefly summarizing, property rights and interests most
affected or created by the sale of land for taxes may be
enumerated as follows: (1) The title of the original owner or his
privities; (2) the interest of lien holders in the property which
is the subject matter of the sale; (3) the defeasible title of the
purchaser; (4) the right of the original owner or his privity to
redeem; (5) the right of possession of the original owner or his
privity; (6) the purchaser's lien in case of invalid sale; and (7)
the right of the purchaser to possession of the land and perfection
of the defeasible title in case the sale is valid.
The statutes of limitations applying to these different
interests and rights and the procedure for enforcing them have
been changed by law from time to time in such a manner as to
create apparent inconsistencies which have led to much confusion and diversity of opinion.
From 1906 to 1932 a purchaser other than the taxing
districts could obtain possession from the original owner in six
months after giving notice required by section 4153, Kentucky
Statutes, 1930, and the taxing districts as purchaser could obtain
possession 30 days after giving such notice. If the purchaser,
1 Ibid.

12Ky. Stat. (Carroll's 1936), Sec. 4159.
U Ky. Stat. (Carroll's 1936), Sec. 4030.
" 4Commonwealth v. Union Labor Temple Corp. et al., decided
June 23, 1939.
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whether the taxing districts or another, gave proper notice and
took possession as soon as permissible by statute, the original
owner could redeem the property at any time within two years
from the date of sale.15
In cases whlcre the taxing districts are the purchaser, it was
held in Brown, Extrx. v. Greene, Auditor, 184 Ky. 300, 211 S. W.
860, that the original owner could redeem the land after the title
has vested in the taxing districts, if he did so before the auditor
or the revenue agent sells the land under authority of section
4154. However, the Court, without considering the Brown case,
held directly contra to this in Southern Securities Corp. v.
Commonwealth, supra, wherein it was stated in substance that if
at the end of the two-year period the title had matured in the
taxing districts, the original owner could not redeem it, and
that the only way he could regain the title was to purchase it
from the auditor in the manner provided in section 4154. This
investigation has not discovered a latter decision reversing the
Southern Securities case. However, it should be remembered that
this opinion deais only with, the two-year redemption period provided in section 4151-2 before any of its several amendments.
The purchaser could not prior to 1932 bring procedings to
recover possession after five years from the time the taxes for
which the property was sold became in arrears. 16
Section 4151-2 of the 1930 Statutes was amended in 1932 so
as to guarantee possession to the owner of the equity of redemption for five years. 17 The amendment further provided that
"at any time after the expiration" of this five-year period the
purchaser could recover possession by giving notice as required
by law.' 8 This section was again amended in 1938 so as to reduce
the period during which the owner was guaranteed possession
from five years to three, but nothing new was added regarding
the time for filing suits to recover possession.' 9
These amendments of 1932 and 1938 did not fix on the
owner of the equity of redemption a five- or three-year time limit
for redeeming the land but simply fixed a time within which
he could not be dispossessed.20
Ky. Stat. (Carroll's 1930), See. 4151-2.
26Ky. Stat. (Carroll's 1930), Sec. 4021a-1.
See n. 14, 8upra.
17

Stat. (Carroll's 1936), See. 4151-2.
Ky. Stat. (1938 Supplement), Sec. 4151-2.
See n. 14, supra.

23Ky.
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In fact, after thlese amendments such owner could and can
redeem at any time before recovery of possession by any purchaser, and if the purchaser were the taxing districts, he could
and can redeem any time before the Commissioner of Revenue
offers the property for sale under authority of section 4154 following recovery of possession by the county attorney as provided
in section 4153.'1
The court in construing these sections as they relate to
actions for possession held in the case of Commonwealth v. Randolph, 277 Ky. 724, 127 S.W. (2d) 398 (1939), that that part
of section 4021a-1 of the 1936 Statutes which provides:
"No action or other proceeding . . . for recovery of possession
of any property which has been sold for taxes shall be maintained

unless such action or proceeding is commenced within five years from

the date on which the taxes become in arrears;
was inconsistent with that part of section 4151-2 as amended in
Kentucky Statutes, 1938 Supplement, which provided in substance that the purchaser could have possession at any time after
the expiration of the five years allowed for redemption by giving
proper notice, and had been impliedly repealed by the amendment. It further held that under section 2515 of the Statutes
the county attorney had five years succeeding the expiration of
the five-year period during which the original owner was given
possession in which to file suit for possession. It is significant
that the Court did not hold that the five-year limitation on suits
for possession provided in section 4021a-1 applied beginning with
the expiration of the said five-year period or any other time.
Section 2505 provides in substance that a suit to recover
possession of land must be brought within fifteen years, whereas section 2515 only provides a five-year limitation on actions
for which no other limitation is provided. In view of this fact
one may well wonder how the Court reached the conclusion that
2515 fixed the limitation on actions to recover possession of land
for taxes instead of section 2505. Be that as it may, it is clear
that under this opinion the county attorney can recover possession for the Commonwealth, county, and other taxing districts at
any time within five years after expiration of the time during
which the original owner is by statute given, possession, whereas
there has been a common belief that the right to possession was
barred five years after the sale. Although the case does not con" Ky. Stat. (1938 Supplement).
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sider the limitation on such suits by a purchaser other than the
state and county, it seems reasonable to presume that the limitation on such actions is the same for both classes of purchasers
except for a slight difference caused by variances in the time
specified for notice incidental to possession from the two classes
of purchasers. This case, therefore, seems to establish clearly the
limitation for suits by purchasers to recover possession.
Almost all sheriffs' sales have in the past been invalid for
one reason or another. 22 This, therefore, lends prominence to
the question of how and when the purchaser's lien under
section 4036 of the Statutes may be enforced.
In the Union Labor Temple case, supra, the commonwealth
proceeded under authority of section 4154-1 to have the sheriff's
sales of land to the Commonwealth for taxes assessed for the
years 1929, 1930, and 1931 against the Union Labor Temple
Corporation declared invalid, and the lien under section 4036
established and foreclosed. The Corporation offered no defense,
but two lien holders filed answer alleging that the lien was barred
in five years after the sale. The Commonwealth demurred to the
answer. The Jefferson Circuit Court overruled the demurrer,
bholding that the lien was barred under section 4021a-1 five years
from the date of the sale. The Commonwealth declined to plead
further and appealed.
The significant provisions of section 4154-1 and 4036 as
amended from time to time are set forth in the following excerpt
from the Union Labor Temple case, supra:
"Section 4036, Kentucky Statutes, originally enacted in 1906, provided that whenever any person should purchase property sold for
delinquent taxes and the sale was set aside, the purchaser should
have a lien on the property for the amount of taxes and costs paid by
him with interest, which could be recovered from the owner of the
property. This section was amended by act of 1934 by adding thereto
the following language:
"'Such lien may be enforced against such property by action
as are other liens, at any time after the invalid sale but prior to
the expiration of the lien by reason of limitation, whether the purchaser be the Commonwealth of Kentucky and other taxing districts or any other person, firm or Corporation.'
"The 1938 Special Session of the General Assembly enacted House
Bill A-42, section 6 of which is now section 4154-1, Kentucky Statutes,
which provided in substance that when the Commonwealth had reason
to believe any sale made by the sheriff or collector under section 4149
of the Statutes was, for any reason, invalid, such invalidity might be
alleged in a proceeding to establish the lien provided for in section
2 See n. 14, supra.
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4036, Kentucky Statutes, above mentioned. The concluding paragraph
of this section 4154-1, Kentucky Statutes, is as follows:
"'No proceeding should be instituted on behalf of the Commonwealth to establish the lien provided for in section 4036, Carroll's
Kentucky Statutes, 1936 Edition, until after the expiration of the
time which must expire before proceedings to recover possession
can be instituted.'"

The trial court, considering the amendment of 1934 to
section 4036 in connection with section 4021a-1, thought that
the legislative purpose of this amendment was to bar the lien
under section 4036 within five years after the invalid sale, and
that the purpose of the Legislature in enacting section 4154-1
23
was to remove such limitation.
The Court of Appeals, after discussing at length the legislative intent behind these amendments, reversed the d.eision of
the trial court, holding that the Legislature had not seen fit to
provide any limitation as to the time for invalidating a tax sale,
and that the purchaser's lien provided in section 4036 did not
accrue until there was a judicial determination of invalidity.
However, it did hold that the lien would have to be foreclosed
within five years from the date of the judgment of invalidity or
be barred by section 2515.
In reaching this conclusion the Court made, among others,
the following significant observations: (1) That the lien under
4036 was not a tax lien, but a purchaser's lien for costs, commission, penalty, interest, as well as taxes which equity would
have given the purchaser even in the absence of statutory authority; (2) that section 4021a-1 could only apply to tax liens and
therefore did not apply to purchaser's liens. Incidentally,
section 4021a-1 was amended in 1938 so as to provide specifically
that it apply only to the tax lien under section 4021, Kentucky
24
Statutes.
Since the lien under section 4036 is not a tax lien, this
opinion does no violence to previous opinions to the effect that
a tax lien is barred five years after the taxes become in arrears.
However, it is definitely a rebuff to the theory that if taxes were
paid for five years back there could be no enforceable lien of any
sort against the property which would include taxes delinquent
more than five years. Clearly under this opinion there is an
exception to this view in the case where land has been sold for
See n. 14, supra.
*'Ky. Stat. (1938 Supplement), Sec. 4021a-1.
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taxes, as the Commonwealth (and presumably a purchaser other
than the Commonwealth) will be entitled to be made whole on the
investment which includes taxes regardless of the amount of time
that may elapse before the sale is judically declared invalid.
This opinion appears to obtain the right result because
there should be no duty on the purchaser to invalidate his own
claim of title and right to possession. The Legislature only gave
such right to the Commonwealth as a practical means of clearing thousands of invalid sales by the sheriff of land to which
the taxing districts had no real desire to take the title or possession.25 This eliminated the unnecessary and awkward procedure of having to file thousands of suits to recover possession
which were certain to be defeated before filing a suit to foreclose
the lien under section 4036. Under the new procedure only one
action is necessary.
However, it should be observed that a purchaser other than
the Commonwealth has not been given the statutory authority
to attack his own claim of title or right of possession. It is
difficult to assign a reason for requiring him so to do, as he is
in all probability more interested in perfecting his title than
establishing the lien; whereas, the primary concern of the Commonwealth is to collect the taxes due on the property and thereby require it to bear its just share of the burdens of the government. The Commonwealth and its taxing subdivisions should
not be interested in taking the title away from the taxpayer if
it can be avoided.
The manner in which the purchaser, especially the Commonwealth, may in the future be expected to enforce these rights
will now be considered.
The procedure required of the sheriff in making the sale
has been considerably simplified by the 1938 Act. For example,
he is no longer required to distrain and sell personal property
before selling real estate.2 6 He may sell either or both without
making a preference. Tbke manner of advertising the sale has
also been improved. 27 The Department of Revenue has assisted
sheriffs in the d'afting of handbills and newspaper advertising
of the sale, and has prepared forms to be used by the sheriff in
making the certificate required by sections 4158 and 4162 of the
See n. 14, supra.

"Ky.
27

Ibid.

Stat. (1938 Supplement),

Sec. 4149.
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1938 Supplement. Furthermore, the law now requires a registered letter, instead of a post card as formerly required, to be
mailed the taxpayer if his address is known. The present procedure is to attach the return receipt for the registered letter and
the notice of the sale to the sheriff's certificate so that they will
be recorded by the clerk along with the certificate. These will
materially aid the county attorney in proving the validity of
the sale.
In view of these facts it may reasonably be expected that
most sheriff's sales will be valid in the future. This being true,
the county attorney can in the future institute proceedings
to take possession of the land as provided in section 4153 with
reasonable assurance that be will be able to maintain the action.
Of course, if he has reason to believe that he cannot successfully
maintain such action, he may elect to have the sale declared
invalid and the lien under section 4036 established and foreclosed. If he does elect to file a suit to recover possession and is
defeated by the original owner's plea that the sheriff's sale was
invalid, on the basis of such decision he would be entitled to foreclose the lien resulting under section 4036. If, on the other hand,
the original owner does not appear and allege invalidity of the
sheriff's sale, it seems that the Commonwealth would be entitled
to a default judgment and that the original owner would be
barred from thereafter attacking the Commonwealth's right to
possession or the title of any purchaser later buying the property
from the Commonwealth following a sale thereof by the Commissioner of Revenue under authority of section 4154. It would
also seem that if all parties having an interest in the property are
made defendants in such suits to recover possession, they would
likewise be barred from later attacking the Commonwealth's
right to possession if they permit default judgment by failure
to appear.
A purchaser other than the Commonwealth should stand
on "all fours" with the Commonwealth in all these respects
except that he does not have the statutory authority to attack
the validity of the sale at which he is the purchaser.
If a purchaser other than the taxing districts does not
institute proceedings to recover possession of the land witin
the time allowed, there is probably no method whereby he can
initiate proceedings to foreclose his lien under section 4036
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unless equity will permit him so to do. Equity probably would
not extend such a remedy in view of the fact that he had a
remedy at law (possession suit) which he did not timely pursue.
As already pointed out, his natural interest in this respect is
materially different to that of the Commonwealth and county
when they are the purchaser. However, there is no reason to
believe that he could not assert this lien if the original owner of
the property should in any way on his (the original owner's)
own initiative have the sale set aside, for in that instance the
lien would accrue and the purchaser would have five years from
the date of the judgment of invalidity in which to foreclose it.28
Therefore, it seems likely that if a purchaser other than the
taxing districts is not vigilant he may under the present law lose
his entire investment in eight years after the date of the sale,
unless the original owner makes the mistake of having the sale
declared invalid after that time.
The necessity for limitations on actions to invalidate
sheriff's sales so as to enable abstractors of title to have a definite
stopping place in checking for delinquent taxes may be of
enough public significance to warrant legislation to that effect.
This matter will not be considered herein further than to point
out that the mere fact that a purchaser may elect to attack his
own claim of title or right of possession should not impose upon
him any duty so to do and any legislation should consider this
factor. The law already imposes on the purchaser the duty of
perfecting his defeasible title within a certain time; otherwise
he is barred from the privilege.
Early cases held that the original owner of the property
could attack the validity of the sale as an incident to recovery
of possession from the purchaser any time before such owner's
right to recover possession was barred by adverse possession
under section 2505, Kentucky Statutes.2 9 Also, numerous cases
held that if a sheriff's deed to the purchaser was invalid; there
was no limitation as to the time within which it could be attacked
by the owner. In Miller v. Powers, 184 Ky. 417, 212 S.W.
453, appears the following statement:
"(1) A deed void ab initio confers no title whatever upon the
grantee and in a suit where one relies upon it, may be used for the
" See n. 14, supra.
v. Horton, 185 Ky. 131, 214 S.W. 833 (1919).

2'Horton
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purpose only of showing extent of possession, if adverse possession is
relied upon.
"A tax deed does not confer title on the grantee if the proceedings
by the sheriff, clerk of the county court, and purchaser which lead up
to the deed were irregular, and essential steps were omitted. Such
deed may be attacked at any time because it is void. This may be
done by the owner affirmatively pleading the essential steps omitted,
and if such allegation is sustained by the evidence, judgment should
go awarding the land to the original owner subject to a lien of the
grantee In the tax deed for the amount of the taxes, interest, penalties
and cost, paid by him."

The opinion in the Miller case, supra, was rendered in May,
1919.
In 1930, section 2512a of Carroll's Kentucky Statutes, 1936
Edition, was enacted. That section provided in part as follows:
"When the owner of any real property shall fail to pay the
State and County taxes due thereon for a period of five consecutive
years, and said property has been sold for taxes, after the expiration
of said period by the Sheriff or Auditor of Public Accounts and deeds
executed to the puchaser at any such tax sale, no action in law or in
equity shall be commenced by said owner, his heirs or assigns to set
aside any such tax deed or to recover the title or possession of said
property after five years, from the time such deed is executed, delivered
and lodged for record in the County Clerk's office, in the County where
said property is situated and this limitation shall apply to all such tax
deeds now on record,
...

In view of the quotation from the Miller case, swpra, it
seems that that part of section 2512a which prohibits an action
to set aside a void tax deed after five years from the time it was
executed and iecorded can be of no avail. But if the purchaser
has proceeded to take possession according to statute under
claim of title and obtained a deed from the sheriff, it may be
that if he also continues in possession for five years thereafter he will by virtue of this section be entitled to remain in
possession forever. On the other hand, it is conceivable that
this section may fail in its entirety. This investigation has failed
to discover a case in which this section has been construed.
Whether this means that it has been generally considered of no
avail is conjectural.
It is probably appropriate in conclusion to point out that
since the enactment of House Bill A-42 of the First Extraordinary Session of the General Assembly of 193830 and the more
careful administration of sheriff's sales by the Department of
Revenue, statistics in that Department indicate that there has
been approximately a 17 per cent reduction in the number of
"Ky. Stat. (1938 Supplement), Secs. 4073, 4074, 4130, 4149, et seq.

K. L. J.-2
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sales of land for delinquent taxes during the year 1939 as compared to 1938, and that people are now paying taxes on property
which has not been bearing its share of the burden of taxaticn.
Investigation has also revealed that an extremely high percentage of tax delinquencies as shown by the sheriff's sales are
fictitious. For example, a person may sell his land and the
county tax commissioner may thereafter list it in the name of
both the vendor and the vendee. The vendee may pay the taxes
and the sheriff may sell the same parcel of land in the name of
the vendor so that in effect the tax bill against the vendor is
nothing more than a duplication of the tax bill which the vendee
has paid.
A similar situation frequently arises when the heirs of land
list it in their names and the county tax commissioner also
assesses it in the name of the decedent.
It should be observed that article 3 of chapter 22 of the
Acts of the General Assembly of 1906, which provided for forfeiture of land for failure to list it for taxes or pay the taxes
thereon for five consecutive years, was repealed by House Bill
A-42, First Extraordinary Session of the General Assembly, in
1938. This bill also provides that once land has been sold for
taxes to the Commonwealth, it cannot be later assessed for taxes
until after it has been redeemed.

